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Abstract: In light of climate change and security concerns, decarbonisation has become a priority for
industrialised countries. In the European Union (EU), decarbonisation scenarios used to support
decision-making predict a steady decrease in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, mostly driven by
changes in production mixes and improvements in efficiency. In the EU’s decarbonisation pathways,
the power sector plays a large role, reaching zero emissions by 2050. From a biophysical perspective,
decarbonisation becomes not just a matter of replacing carbon-intensive with carbon-neutral electricity
flows, but also a matter of building and maintaining new infrastructure (funds) which, in turn,
is associated with GHG emissions. By not accounting for the emissions associated with funds,
particularly those required to increase grid flexibility, scenarios used to inform decarbonisation
narratives in the EU are missing a key part of the picture. We show that a rapid and deep
decarbonisation of the EU’s power sector through a production-side transition between the years
2020 and 2050 leads to cumulative emissions of the order of 21–25 Gt of CO2 equivalent, within a
range of approximately 35–45%. The results are obtained by modelling two decarbonisation pathways
where grid flexibility increases either through storage or through curtailment. The analysis suggests
that scenarios informing decarbonisation policies in the EU are optimistic and may lead to a narrow
focus on sustainable production transformations. This minimises the perceived urgency of reducing
overall energy consumption to stay within safe carbon budgets.
Keywords: modelling; science-policy interface; grid flexibility; bio-economics; energy transition;
storage; curtailment
1. Introduction
The type of primary energy sources (PES) used by societies to generate a given mix of energy
carriers (ECs) is central in shaping their organisation, pace and activities [1,2]. Industrial societies have
developed through a heavy reliance on fossil fuels, characterised by their high density. In addition,
fossil fuels can be stored and transported across borders, bypassing local natural resource limitations.
The exploitation of fossil fuels, while shaping industrial societies’ activities and allowing for a high
living standard and rapid rates of urbanisation [3], has also led to unbearable environmental effects,
locally and globally. As a consequence, moving away from fossil-based energy systems has become a
priority for industrialised economies. In addition to environmental concerns, in the EU, a renewable
transformation of the energy system is also desirable from a security of supply perspective, given the
lack of indigenous fossil fuels on local territory [4–6].
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Thus, it has become progressively pressing in the EU to shift to alternative (local) energy sources
resulting in lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions throughout their lifetime [6]. However, the shift
itself has not been easy to initiate, model or govern. The Energiewende is an example of this, having
led overall to higher electricity prices and higher emissions, despite strong efforts to shift production
patterns of energy carriers [7].
Depending on the chosen problem framing, barriers to a renewable energy transition may be
conceived as being of a political, economic, social, institutional or biophysical nature. We borrow
the term biophysical from the field of bio-economics, where the economic process is viewed not only
through the lens of monetary flows, but most importantly through the lens of flows of biological
and physical resources that are produced, distributed, consumed and exchanged [8]. In this sense,
the amount of water, emissions and labour associated with a certain energy system, for example,
may be categorised as biophysical variables, in opposition to economic ones such as energy prices.
Within the field of bio-economics, the term energy metabolism is used to describe the way in which
societies extract, process and distribute flows of energy in order to carry out tasks that are crucial to
the survival of their identity [9].
Taking a biophysical perspective of the energy system, in this paper we focus on the decarbonisation
of the EU’s power sector. Our aim is to provide an alternative narrative to those underpinning EU
decarbonisation pathways, where barriers to energy transformations are mostly relegated to the domain
of finance and investments [6]. To do this, we model alternative decarbonisation pathways that include
the GHG emissions associated with the lifetime of funds. We borrow the distinction between funds and
flows from Georgescu-Roegen [8]. Within Georgescu-Roegen’s flow-fund model, given a chosen spatial
and temporal scale of analysis, funds are those elements whose identity remains intact, while flows are
elements either entering the system without exiting it or exiting it without entering it. From a metabolic
perspective, funds are the elements metabolising flows—land, for example, is a fund to be maintained,
while the food it grows is a flow. Considering an energy system over a yearly timescale, the electricity and
fuels produced and consumed are flows. The infrastructure and human time invested in the production
and consumption of flows are the funds of the system.
This distinction is important to study the implications of infrastructural changes in the energy
system. The magnitude of infrastructural changes required on the production and consumption side
for a decarbonisation of the energy system are not unknown to policymakers [10]. However, there is a
tendency within scenarios at the EU’s science-policy interface to use biophysical variables to describes
changes in flows (e.g., the amount of electricity consumed over a year) and to adopt a monetary
perspective to account for changes in infrastructure (e.g., the investments required to build new
transmission and distribution lines). When considering changes associated with funds, a biophysical
perspective (e.g., the amount of labour, emissions, water and waste associated with infrastructural
changes) is often neglected. This is the case, for example, in the EU 2016 Reference Scenario, where
capital investments linked to infrastructure are estimated [11].
Building on data available through existing studies, we developed a scenario singling out
the EU power sector up to 2050 and hypothesized two different pathways for its decarbonisation.
Increasing grid flexibility is central to ensuring that high levels of variable renewable energy (VRE)
can be managed by the grid [12]. In the first pathway, grid flexibility was increased through high rates
of curtailment of renewable generation and low storage; in the second, lower levels of curtailment
were paired with storage technologies. In each pathway, the emissions associated with the cultivation,
construction and fabrication (CFC) of funds were calculated at yearly intervals up to the year 2050,
in addition to the operational emissions associated with electricity generation (flows). The approach
is meta-analytical and adjusts data available in literature, rather than modelling the behaviour of
the grid.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the decarbonisation
pathways currently modelled to support EU decision-making and places them within the wider
academic discourses of energy and GHG payback time; Section 3 introduces alternative pathways,
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with an overview of the underpinning assumptions (Section 3.1) and modelling equations (Section 3.2).
The results and discussion are presented in Section 4, split into yearly and cumulative GHG emissions
(Section 4.1), variational ranges in results (Section 4.2) and discussion of results (Section 4.3).
2. Background
2.1. Decarbonisation in EU Policy
In the EU, the energy sector accounted for approximately 30% of total emissions in 2016. It was the
sector with the highest share of emissions, followed by transport and by manufacturing (accounting
for approximately 20% each) [13]. EU decarbonisation policies fall under the 2050 low-carbon economy
package [14], as part of the EU’s wider climate strategy. The low-carbon economy roadmap calls for
GHG emissions to be cut by 80% below the 1990 levels by 2050, with two intermediate milestones of
40% by 2030 and 60% by 2040. The strategy is currently being renewed in order to reflect the Paris
Agreement and is expected to be updated by early 2019 [15].
The EU Energy Roadmap 2050, published in 2011, highlights four strategic directions for
decarbonisation: energy efficiency, renewable energy sources (RES), nuclear and carbon capture and
storage (CCS). The four directions are explored through six scenarios: current policies, high efficiency,
high RES, delayed CCS, low nuclear and diversified supply technologies. Since the publication
of the Energy Roadmap 2050, significant events such as the Paris Agreement and the release of
the Clean Energy for all Europeans package have impacted EU energy discourses. In light of this,
new scenarios have been developed to inform the EU’s mid-century strategy, to be released by fall this
year (2018). The scenarios included in the Clean Energy for all Europeans package model pathways to
decarbonisation based on efficiency, integration of renewable energy sources and the functioning of the
internal energy market [16]. The main trends, which are an increased share of RES, a linear decrease of
GHG and an increased electrification, have persisted across the two generations of scenarios.
In the six decarbonisation scenarios of the Energy Roadmap 2050, RES rise significantly, to a
minimum of 55% of gross consumption of energy carriers in 2050 and 60–80% of gross electricity
production by the same year. Absolute electricity production increases steadily between 20 and
40% by 2050 across the six scenarios, despite an overall reduction in total energy consumption.
This reflects trends in mitigation scenarios, where a gradual electrification of the energy system is
seen as a key element for its decarbonisation [17]. Emissions across all sectors decrease steadily and
monotonically—that is, there is no increase in emissions associated with infrastructural change and
there are no relative peaks of GHG emissions throughout the years. Figure 1 shows an example of
projected sectoral emission reduction in the high RES pathway.
The power sector, in particular, is seen to reach zero or almost zero emissions by 2050 for all pathways,
as further indicated by the low-carbon strategy: “The power sector has the biggest potential for cutting
emissions. It can almost totally eliminate CO2 emissions by 2050” [14]. Similarly, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) highlights the decarbonisation of the power sector as one of the three
main components of mitigation scenario studies, together with a gradual electrification of the energy sector
and a reduction in energy demand through technology and other substitutions [17].
The scenarios developed to support the Energy Roadmap 2050 build on the PRIMES
(Price-Induced Market Equilibrium System) energy model, “a partial equilibrium modelling system
that simulates an energy market equilibrium in the European Union and each of its Member States” [18].
For the accounting of GHG emissions, the model simulates the operational emissions associated
with electricity production (a flow) but neglects the emissions associated with the construction of
infrastructure (a fund). This omission is linked to the fact that grid flexibility requirements are not
modelled. A small but growing body of literature in academia, as highlighted in the next sub-section,
points towards the emissions associated with renewable infrastructure and to storage, and to how they
may impact future decarbonisation pathways. Additionally, the need to increase grid flexibility at high
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renewable energy penetrations has been stressed and modelled for specific case studies, including
Europe [19], Japan [20], Texas [21] and California [22].
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However, EU energy policy discourses uphold the narrative that the main barrier to a high integration
of RES into the energy system is financial rather than biophysical. The renewable energy package [6],
for example, highlights a number of barriers envisioned on the path to a fully renewable energy system,
including administrative hurdles, cost-effectiveness, loss of citizen buy-in and uncertainty for investors.
Grid stability is also mentioned as an issue, with the electricity system needing to “adapt to an increasingly
decentralized and variable production” [6]. Despite this mention, the issue is not framed as being central
and no concrete targets for adaptation have been set, nor have the (biophysical) implications of increasing
grid flexibility been included in the EU decarbonisation pathways.
2.2. Energy and GHG Payback Time
The biophysical investments (such as energy and land) associated with the construction of energy
systems have been the subject of a prolific field of energy analysis. The widely used concept of
Energy Returned on Energy Invested (EROI) accounts for the amount of net energy generated by an
energy system, when the fixed capital and variable operational energy investments required for its
construction and maintenance are discounted [23,24]. EROI is particularly relevant for the assessment
of alternative energy carriers, such as biofuels, requiring a high energetic investment throughout their
production chain [25]. A parallel concept to EROI is the Energy Payback Time (EPBT), accounting for
the amount of time it takes for an energy system to break even in terms of the production of energy
carriers (in relation to those consumed in its construction). So far, EPBT has been mostly applied to
the analysis of solar panels [26,27]. Similar to EPBT, the emissions associated with the construction
and operation of energy systems can be accounted for in what is known as the GHG, carbon or
environmental payback time (GHGPBT). The GHGPBT indicates the time it takes for a system to
become carbon neutral following an initial emission investment due to material extraction, transport
and construction [28,29]. Figure 2 shows a schematic view of the concepts of energy and GHG payback
time, central to the biophysical accounting of energy systems.
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The concepts of energy and GHG payback time can be applied to storage s ste s. A high
penetration of inter ittent e er s rces i t t e electricit grid is likely to require a combination of
demand-side management, storage infrastructure and improve ent of tra smission and distribution
lines to e sur that intermittent lectricity is dispatchable t all times [12]. Studies on storage
estimations for a 100% renewable lectricity system pres nt high doses of uncertainty, however,
the most t orough reviews point towards st rage needs gr atly beyond what is currently operational
at the global scale [20–22]. Thus, the importance of being able to assess and compare the perf rm nce
of storage systems has become evident. Building o the i ea of EROI, B rnhart and Benson [30]
intr duced the concept of E ergy Stored on En rgy Invested (ESOI), accounting for the amount
of net energy output provided by storage technologies compared to the energy invested in their
construction and operation. Battery t chnologies show a performance pproximately 20 times lower
(in terms of ESOI) than compressed air nergy storage (CAES) and pumped hydroelectric storage
(PHS). However, due to the invasiv nature of CAES and PHS and due to the strong limitations to
their expansion brought by geographic configurations, batteries have become popular option in the
discussion of storage futures [31].
In a biophysical framing, the GHG emissions of storage technologies throughout their lifetime
are a key element in the a se sment of future energy scenarios. A thorough review by Denholm [31]
showed how PHS is a sociated with the lowest amount of emi sions over its lifetime, while batteries
are a sociated with non-negligible lifetime emi sions. In its present form, CAES relies on the use of
natural gas and therefore also presents non-negligible lifeti e e issions.
Similar t t emis ions of storage infrastruct re, the GHG emission associ ted with the lifecycle
of ren wable infrastructure have been studied—se Nug nt and Sovacool [32] for a th ough review
of the topic. The emission associated with renewable electricity generation ver its lifetime are
considerably lower than those as ociated with fossil electricity. As a con equence, not much attention
has been plac d in exploring the nuanc s of different pathways and storage options in terms of their
associated emissions. Crucial questions regarding the best pathways to decarbonisation i relation to
mission curves, thus, r main underexplored [32].
3. Alternative Decarbonisation Pathways
When dealing with complex systems, such as the social-ecological one, modelling may have
two purposes: To predict and control future states of the system or to better understand the current
one [33]. As the high doses of uncertainty attached to the prediction of future states of the complex
social-ecological system become apparent, scenarios used to support decision-making are framed more
and more as tools for deliberation, rather than prediction. The EU webpage on energy modelling,
for example, states that the EU Reference Scenario, “one of the European Commission’s key analysis
tools in the areas of energy, transport and climate action”, ( . . . ), “is not designed as a forecast of what
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3685 6 of 17
is likely to happen in the future but it provides a benchmark against which new policy proposals can
be assessed” [34]. In a similar spirit, the aim of the alternative decarbonisation pathways is not to
predict the behaviour of future decarbonisation pathways in the EU. Rather, the aim is to flag the need
to include emissions associated with the construction of infrastructure in decarbonisation discourses.
This is particularly relevant for intermittent sources of energy and their grid flexibility requirements.
We explored two decarbonisation pathways of the EU’s power sector for the years 2020–2050, each
dealing differently with grid flexibility requirements. Focus was given to the integration of renewable
energy into the grid as a means to decrease GHG emissions, in line with the high RES scenario of the
EU’s Energy Roadmap 2050, on which the two pathways were based. The values of gross electricity
consumption up to 2050, in fact, were taken from the high RES scenario, as well as the share of nuclear
electricity at each year. Hydropower was assumed to remain unchanged over the years, while solar
power and wind power were assumed to increase until producing 90% of electricity, entirely phasing
out fossil power plants. Adjusting data from existing studies, we calculated the emissions associated
with the construction and operation of funds (renewable and storage infrastructure) with respect to
the reduction in emissions due to the substitution of fossil with alternative energy systems (associated
with the electricity generated by the systems—flows).
3.1. Modelling Assumptions
Any model informing the future behaviour of energy systems necessarily relies on heavy sets of
assumptions regarding technology, consumption and production patterns. Modelling assumptions
of the alternative decarbonisation pathways are split into two sections: grid flexibility and
GHG emissions.
3.1.1. Grid Flexibility
Integrating high levels of variable renewable energy (VRE), such as the electricity produced by
wind turbines or solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, into the grid requires an increase in the flexibility of
the grid. Grid flexibility can be achieved in various ways. Kondziella and Bruckner [12] identified
seven possible measures on the production and on the consumption side: highly flexible power
plants, large-scale energy storage, curtailment of renewable surplus, demand-side management, grid
extension, virtual power plants and linkage of energy markets. These measures, either individually
or in unison, can ensure that electricity demand is met at all times. Here, focus was given to the
production-side measures of large-scale energy storage and of the curtailment of renewable surplus.
Existing studies [12,19–22,35,36] show that increasing grid flexibility becomes essential when the
share of VRE fed into the grid reaches levels of 40 to 50%. Grid flexibility can be increased through
large-scale energy storage. In this case, surplus electricity generated by VRE when production is higher
than demand can be converted into gravitational, thermal or electrochemical energy and fed back
into the system when production is lower than demand. Curtailment of renewable surplus, on the
other hand, relies on the installation of more renewable infrastructure than what is needed to cover
average yearly demand (also known as backup power plants). When the combined electrical output of
the renewable infrastructure is higher than the demand at a given point in time, the output of VRE
plants is curtailed. As a result, curtailment of renewable surplus as a means to improve grid flexibility
has an impact on the utilisation factor (UF) of renewable plants. The review paper by Kondziella and
Bruckner [12] provided a thorough overview of existing studies assessing grid flexibility requirements
for high renewable integration.
Steinke [19] examined the interplay between storage, curtailment and grid extensions for a 100%
renewable electricity system in Europe. Denholm and Hand [21] and Denholm and Margolis [22]
modelled, respectively, the electricity grids of Texas and California to provide an assessment of how
grid flexibility can be achieved in low and high storage scenarios. The models of US case studies,
produced for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), have not been replicated in the EU
to this level of detail and are the most comprehensive reference points for assessments of grid flexibility.
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Building on these studies [21,22], we hypothesised two pathways for decarbonisation: a low storage
high curtailment (LSHC) pathway and a high storage low curtailment (HSLC) one. In the former,
we assumed that no extra storage technologies were added to the EU’s electricity system, therefore the
only storage services available up to 2050 were those produced by current PHS facilities (at a storage
capacity of approximately 600 GWh [37]). To ensure grid flexibility, renewable back up power was
added and renewable generation was assumed to be curtailed. In the latter, curtailment was greatly
decreased by the addition of storage services. Both scenarios adapted the curtailment and flexibility
rates from the comprehensive model of the Texas grid [21]. The relations between curtailment and
flexibility in the EU depend on specific geographies and grid configurations. However, for the purpose
of these pathways—i.e., to point towards a problem in GHG accounting rather than to provide accurate
predictions—this approximation was considered satisficing.
The total amount of storage required by 2050 was calculated following Steinke [19] and Renner
and Giampietro [35]. Assuming that grid expansions were limited to the national scale and that no
backup generation was provided, Steinke estimated that the EU would require between 7 and 30 days
of storage to accommodate shares of 90% or more of VRE. Analysing data for Germany and Spain over
an 84 months and 132 months, with a resolution of 60 minutes and 10 minutes respectively, Renner and
Giampietro estimated that the two countries would require approximately one week of storage capacity
in a 100% intermittent penetration scenario. The study used the comprehensive datasets available
for the two countries to check “the extent of the predicted worst annual hypothetical ‘failure event’
(where the guaranteed level of intermittently sourced electricity is not met)”. The results by Renner
and Giampietro for Germany are in line with the analysis by Kuhn [36], predicting a requirement of
installed storage charging power in Germany of the order of 53 GW by 2050. Similar values apply to
the case of Japan [20], where, despite a different energy mix and configuration, it was also found that
storage requirements are on the order of a week of average electricity supply.
Thus, storage capacity requirements for 2050, where gross electricity production is assumed to
grow to approximately 5140 TWh, were assumed to be on the order of a week of average daily demand.
It was then assumed that PHS, the most implemented and mature storage technology in the EU and
worldwide, increased up to its viable potential in the EU, following the analysis by Gimeno-Gutiérrez
and Lacal-Arántegui [38]. Then, battery energy storage (BES) was introduced to cover the gap between
the maximum PHS potential and the total storage capacity needed. The relevant assumptions shared
across pathways and those differing for each pathway are collected in Tables 1 and 2 respectively,
at ten-year snapshots between 2020 and 2050.
Table 1. Assumptions on the evolution of the energy system shared for the two decarbonisation
pathways (low storage high curtailment—LSCH, and high storage low curtailment—HSLC).
Variable 2020 2030 2040 2050
Gross electricity consumption (GWh) 3,665,400 3,666,000 4,357,600 5,140,600
Daily electricity consumption (GWh) 10,042 10,043 11,939 14,084
Hydropower (%) 10 10 9 7
Nuclear (%) 24 16 8 3
Fossil plants (%) 40 27 14 0
Wind power (%) 14 29 46 62
Solar power (%) 6 12 20 27
Other renewables (%) 5 5 5 0
Following the EU high RES pathway, gross electricity consumption increased in both
pathways, despite an overall reduction in energy consumption—mirroring the trend of electrification.
Hydropower (excluding PHS) was assumed to remain unchanged throughout the years, therefore as
electricity generation increased its share in the electricity mix decreased. Nuclear power was assumed
to gradually decrease in absolute and relative terms. All other non-renewable power plants were
grouped under the umbrella term fossil plants and eliminated by 2050. The share of wind and solar
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power rose gradually until reaching 90% of the total generation share in 2050. The relative contribution
of wind and solar power remained fixed at 70 and 30% respectively, mirroring their 2016 relative
contribution in the EU. This was also in line with what was identified by Denholm and Hand [21] as
the optimal balance between the two types of generation technologies to ensure minimum curtailment.
Table 2. Relevant characteristics of two decarbonisation pathways: low storage high curtailment
(LSHC) and high storage low curtailment (HSLC).
Variable Alternative Pathway 2020 2030 2040 2050
Gross electricity consumption (GWh) LSHC 3,665,400 3,666,000 4,357,600 5,140,600
HSLC 3,665,400 3,666,000 4,357,600 5,140,600
Gross production from wind power (GWh) LSHC 505,270 1,057,690 2,228,440 5,110,500
HSLC 505,270 1,057,690 2,049,370 3,194,070
Gross production from solar PV (GWh) LSHC 216,540 453,300 955,040 2,190,220
HSLC 216,540 453,300 878,300 1,587,910
Curtailment rate (%)
LSHC 0 0 10 60
HSLC 0 0 0 20
Storage capacity (GWh) LSHC 600 600 600 600
HSLC 600 14,570 51,100 87,630
Wind power UF (%) LSHC 24 24 21 15
HSLC 24 24 23 21
Solar PV UF (%)
LSHC 13 13 12 8
HSLC 13 13 13 11
Wind power capacity (GW) LSHC 240 500 1060 2430
HSLC 240 500 980 1760
Solar PV capacity (GW) LSHC 190 400 840 1920
HSLC 190 400 770 1390
Given the higher curtailment rate in the LSHC scenario, although the gross electricity consumption
was the same as in the HSLC scenario, a higher amount of wind and solar power were assumed to
be generated (see the second and third row of Table 2). The surplus generation was not assumed to
enter the grid but was curtailed. The curtailment rates, also included in Table 2, were taken from
Denholm and Hand [21], by assuming that curtailment rates as a function of VRE penetration can be
generalised. Contrary to storage requirements, which tend to increase linearly as VRE integration
increases, curtailment increases exponentially, meaning that it becomes less and less favourable to rely
on curtailment at higher rates. The amount of storage capacity, in GWh of installed capacity, did not
increase throughout the years for the LSHC scenario. Eurostat does not provide statistics on storage
capacity, and the value of 600 GWh of PHS in the EU was taken from Kougias and Szabó [37]. In the
HSLC scenario, the storage capacity increased up to a week of average demand. The curtailment rates
in both scenarios led to a gradual decrease in the utilisation factors (UF) of wind and solar power,
calculated as the amount of time throughout the year when electricity generated by wind and solar
(GWhused) was fed into the grid:
UF (%) =
GWhused
GWinstalled
× 100
8760
(1)
where GWinstalled is the installed power capacity, and 8760 is the number of hours in a year.
3.1.2. GHG Emissions of Renewable Infrastructure, Storage and Fossil Plants
The values of lifetime GHG emissions of renewable infrastructure, and their associated ranges,
were adjusted from the comprehensive meta-review by Nugent and Sovacool [32]. For GHG emissions
of storage technologies, values were taken from Denholm and Kulcinski [39]. Table 3 summarises the
main technological assumptions of both studies. For renewable infrastructure, Nugent and Sovacool
provide intensive data derived from a number of studies, each with different technical specifications.
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Therefore, the values do not refer to specific technological characteristics. This enlarges the range
of the estimated values, but also their robustness. Storage infrastructure values, similarly, refer to a
review of various existing plants, with the range of technological characteristics included in Table 3.
As the GHG emissions associated with battery energy storage (BES) were an important variable for
the results, the values of Denholm and Kulcinski, dating to 2004, were cross-checked against a recent
study referring specifically to lithium-ion batteries [40]. and were found to be consistent. Since the
scenarios were modelled at the EU level, they did not take into account differences across member
states. The values taken from literature, associated with a range of technological characteristics, reflect
the heterogeneity of infrastructure required across the EU.
Table 3. Ranges of technological assumptions of infrastructure: (a) Renewable infrastructure, adjusted
from Nugent and Sovacool [32]; (b) storage infrastructure, adjusted from Denholm and Kulcinski [39].
(a)
Variable Wind Power Solar PV
Number of studies 41 23
Hub height (m) 10–108 N/A
Rotor diameter (m) 2–116 N/A
Technology N/A Ribbon-Si, Multi-Si, Mono-Si, CdTe
Irradiance (kWh/m2) N/A 1600–1800
Mounting N/A roof, ground, single axis
Lifetime (years) 20–30 15–30
GHG cultivation and fabrication (mean) (g CO2 eq./kWh) 42.98 33.67
GHG construction (mean) (g CO2 eq./kWh) 14.43 8.98
GHG operation (mean) (g CO2 eq./kWh) 14.36 6.15
(b)
Variable PHS BES
Number of facilities 9 N/A
Completion date 1978–1995 N/A
Power (MW) 31–2100 15
Storage capacity (MWh) 279–184,000 120
Energy/power ratio (hours) 13 8
The GHG emissions from the review studies were adjusted as the renewable share of the electricity
mix in the pathways increased, since the electricity mix strongly affects GHG emissions. As we were
singling out the power sector, emissions associated with the use of fuels and other forms of thermal
energy remained invariant. To adjust the values throughout the years, the carbon intensity of the
EU’s electricity mix was estimated each year, starting from 320 g/kWh in 2016 [41] and reaching
almost zero in 2050. The contribution of the electricity mix to the overall GHG emissions of wind
power infrastructure was estimated by comparing existing studies which made a direct link between
the carbon intensity of the electricity production system and the GHG emissions associated with
infrastructure (see Reference [42] for a comparison of Germany and China, Reference [43] for Brazil
and Reference [44] for different values of carbon intensities). The effect of different electricity mixes on
the construction on the lifetime of solar panels was assessed directly by Reich [45] in relation to the
CO2 emission factor of electricity supply. Varying GHG emissions for CFC and Operation are included
in Table 4.
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Table 4. Varying GHG emissions for the cultivation, fabrication and construction (CFC) and operation
of renewable and storage infrastructure.
Variable 2020 2030 2040 2050
CFC, wind infrastructure (t CO2 eq./GW) 906,700 766,020 617,000 470,000
CFC, solar infrastructure (t CO2 eq./GW) 1,418,000 1,199,000 965,000 735,000
CFC, PHS (t CO2 eq./GWh.inst *) 33,800 28,500 23,000 17,500
CFC, BES (t CO2 eq./GWh.inst *) 123,500 104,400 84,000 64,000
Operation, wind turbines (t CO2 eq./GWh) 5 5 5 5
Operation, solar PV (t CO2 eq./GWh) 6 6 6 6
Operation, fossil plants (t CO2 eq./GWh) 450 450 450 450
Operation, PHS (t CO2 eq./GWh) 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Operation, BES (t CO2 eq./GWh) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
* GWh.inst: amount of storage capacity installed.
3.2. Modelling Equations
The values of GHG emissions at a given year were calculated from the secondary data, adjusted
to the EU’s electricity mix for each year, through the following equations:
GHG_stn = GWPV,n × GHG_stPV,n + GWwind,n × GHG_stwind,n + GWPHS,n × GHG_stPHS,n + GWBES,n
× GHG_stBES (2)
GHG_opn = GWhPV,n × GHG_opPV,n + GWhwind,n × GHG_opwind,n + GWhPHS,n × GHG_opPHS,n +
GWhBES,n × GHG_opBES + GWhfossil,n × GHG_opfossil,n
(3)
where:
• GHG_stn are the GHG emissions, in tons of CO2 equivalent, emitted at year n due to the
cultivation, fabrication and construction (CFC) of infrastructure;
• GWPV and GWwind are the amounts of extra solar PV and wind power capacity installed each year;
• GWhPHS and GWhBES are the amounts of extra storage capacity, PHS and BES, added each year;
• GHG_opn are the varying infrastructure emissions at each year n, depending, in turn, on the
electricity mix and expressed in tons of CO2 equivalent/GW for renewable infrastructure and
tons of CO2 equivalent/GWh for renewable infrastructure;
• GWhn is the electricity generation at year n by each technology.
Similarly, the emissions due to the operation of power plants were calculated at each year as the
total amount of electricity generated by each type of power plant (including curtailed electricity) times
the associated operational emissions. The total GHG emissions at year n, thus (GHGtotal,n) were a
combination of multiple factors varying across the years. What we refer to as cumulative emissions,
finally, is the sum of the emissions over the 2020–2050 time period:
GHGtotal =∑2050n = 2020 GHGtotal,n (4)
4. Results and Discussion
The results and discussion are structured in three sections. Firstly, the yearly and cumulative
emissions of the decarbonisation pathways are presented and linked to EU decarbonisation scenarios,
and carbon budgets (Section 4.1); then, variational ranges of the results are discussed (Section 4.2).
Section 4.3, finally, discusses the role played by biophysical variables at the science-policy interface.
4.1. GHG Emission Curves and Cumulative Emissions
To discuss the results of the two decarbonisation scenarios, emissions can be viewed from
three perspectives:
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1. Emission curves at a yearly resolution, useful to comment on the temporal behaviour of emissions
and their possible non-linear evolution;
2. Cumulative emissions up to the year 2050, i.e., the sum of the yearly emissions, which can be
related to carbon budgets;
3. Yearly emissions at the target year 2050, currently the only view used to inform EU
decision-making processes (with different targets set for different years).
Starting with the emission curves provided throughout the years, Figures 3 and 4 show the
behaviour of the GHG emissions of the EU power sector (including cultivation, fabrication and
construction of infrastructure) under the low storage high curtailment (LSHC) scenario. The total
emissions are shown in Figure 3, while Figure 4 breaks the emissions down into those linked to
the operation of power plants (associated with electricity flows) and those linked to the cultivation,
fabrication and construction of renewable infrastructure (associated with funds).
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infrastructural (funds, blue line).
In the LSHC scenario, while the amount of wind and solar infrastructure installed each year
increased exponentially (see Table 2), the e issions associated with the cultivation, fabrication
and construction phases of the infrastructure were mitigated by the steady reduction in operational
emissions, which dropped to almost 0 by 2050. The initial steady decrease in emissions became less
linear from the year 2030, i.e., when curtailment of renewable electricity started. As curtailment
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increased, emissions due to an infrastructure rise led to relative peaks in emissions between the years
2030 and 2050, with overall emissions associated with infrastructure increasing despite the increased
renewable penetration into the system. The behaviour of the curve depended on the rate that renewable
infrastructure was installed.
With high levels of emissions associated with the installation of both PHS and BES storage
technologies (see Table 3), the yearly emission curve for the low curtailment high storage (LCHS)
scenario displays a behaviour which is less linear, as seen in Figures 5 and 6.
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Figure 6. GHG emissions in the HSLC scenario, broken down into operational (flows, green line) and
infrastructural (funds, blue line).
Emissions were strongly dependent on the type of storage infrastructure and on when it was
integrated into the system. Emissions gradually decreased up to the year 2027, when the amount of
installed PHS started to increas consider bly. The biggest peak, how ver, was visible at the year 2035,
when BES technologi s were introduce , s PHS reach d its maximum capacity. p ak can be
softened if BES is gradually installed from the start, however, in this case, cumulative emissions would
be higher as the manufacturing process would rely more heavily on fossil fuels. Thus, different timing
options should be carefully considered from a biophysical perspective.
The behaviour of the curves of Figures 3 and 5, and the presence or absence of relative GHG
emission peaks, can be varied by varying assumptions on timings and introduction of technologies.
This would also vary cumulative emissions, as the emissions associated with the construction of
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infrastructure also depend on the yearly electricity mix. Cumulative emissions are a useful indicator as
they can give us an idea of how much is being emitted by the EU’s power sector during its transitional
phase towards deep decarbonisation. It is expected that, on average, the EU has a carbon budget on
the order of 90 Gt in order to remain within a 2◦ temperature range for the period between 2020 and
2100 [46]. Cumulative emissions associated with the power sector and to the manufacturing of
infrastructure were of the order of 20,830 Mt of CO2 eq. and 25,150 Mt of CO2 eq. respectively, for the
HCLS and LCHS scenarios. Thus, under deep decarbonisation pathways, between the years 2020 and
2050 alone the power sector and its associated manufacturing would emit 23–28% of the total budget
available to the whole society up to the year 2100. As we discuss in Section 4.3, this suggests that
efforts on the production side of the energy system are not enough to stay within safe carbon budgets.
4.2. Analysis of Variational Ranges in the Results
The scenarios presented in this paper build on secondary data collected and adjusted at different
levels of the energy system, from individual technologies to systemic production and consumption
patterns, expressed in the form of estimate ranges. Table 5 collects the estimate ranges associated
with the main variables in the analysis, for the years 2020 and 2050. Table 6 shows how much each
variable contributes to the cumulative emissions at the years 2020 and 2050, reflecting the weight that
the variable’s estimate range holds in the final interval.
The interval associated with the assessments of yearly operational and infrastructural GHG
emissions is determined by a combination of estimate ranges associated with GHG emissions in the base
year from which the data is taken and the estimate range associated with the adjustment of emissions
as renewable penetration increases, using the squaring method for error propagation. At a higher level,
the interval associated with the assessment of consumption patterns can be checked by calculating the
lowest and highest values of electricity consumption present in the six EU decarbonisation scenarios.
The factors playing the largest impact on the final cumulative GHG emission assessments are the GHG
emissions associated with storage infrastructure, curtailment rates and the maximum PHS potential
in the EU. Combining the various ranges into the final assessment of cumulative emissions leads to
intervals on the order of 35% for the high curtailment scenario and 45% for the high storage scenario.
This value is high, especially when it comes to storage GHG emissions and estimations of storage
requirements, however, it does not weaken the main message of the analysis.
Table 5. Variational ranges of the variables.
Category Variable Unit
2020 2050
Average +/− Average +/−
Carbon intensity of
technologies
CFC wind power t CO2 eq./GW 906,700 165,000 470,000 108,100
CFC solar PV t CO2 eq./GW 1,418,000 985,000 735,000 514,500
CFC PHS t CO2 eq./GWh 33,800 4600 17,500 2800
CFC BES t CO2 eq./GWh 123,500 18,000 64,000 11,500
Operation wind power t CO2 eq./GWh 5 1 5 1
Operation solar PV t CO2 eq./GWh 6 1 6 1
Operation PHS t CO2 eq./GWh 2 1 2 1
Operation BES t CO2 eq./GWh 4 1 4 1
Storage
Total storage requirement GWh 0 0 98,600 32,500
Efficiency of PHS and BES % 80 20 80 20
EU PHS potential TWh 30 15 30 15
Production and
consumption patterns
Total electricity
consumption GWh 3,665,380 146,615 5,140,565 668,273
Curtailment rate (LSHC) % 0 0 60 15
Curtailment rate (HSLC) % 0 0 20 5
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Table 6. Relative contribution of each variable (%) to yearly GHG emissions, 2020 and 2050.
Variable
2020 2050
LSHC HSLC LSHC HSLC
Mt of CO2 eq. % Mt of CO2 eq. % Mt of CO2 eq. % Mt of CO2 eq. %
Solar PV
infrastructure 29.5 3 29.5 3 135.6 48 60 16
Wind infrastructure 23.8 2 23.8 2 109.6 39 48.5 13
PHS infrastructure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BES infrastructure 0 0 0 0 0 0 233.8 63
Fossil operation 1064.7 95 1064.7 95 0 0 0 0
Solar operation 1.3 0 1.3 0 13.1 5 9.5 3
Wind operation 2.5 0 2.5 0 25.6 9 18.5 5
PHS operation 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.7 0
BES operation 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.1 1
Total 1122 1122 284 373
4.3. Discussion
To inform decision-making, the type of GHG accounting proposed here is incomplete, as it needs
to be associated with economic analyses and with the assessment of other biophysical variables such
as land and water. While the high curtailment scenario results in overall lower emissions than the high
storage one, it would lead to other trade-offs in different domains, including higher electricity prices
and large areas of land occupied by renewable infrastructure. On the other hand, the high storage
scenario would also be associated with high levels of lithium requirements (to be imported), which may
not be desirable from a security perspective. Additionally, increasing PHS to its maximum potential
may have important consequences for natural water cycles. Synergies and trade-offs also emerge
within and outside EU borders. A part of the emissions derived in the scenarios would necessarily
be located outside of EU borders, such as those for the extraction of primary materials. This points
towards the need of discussing the impact of EU climate targets at different geographical scales.
When it comes to the integration of renewable energy, differences across countries are also
important and should be modelled in relation to grid flexibility and associated GHG emissions.
The Netherlands, for example, is mostly flat and does not have any PHS potential, therefore in an
increased flexibility scenario, it would either require high rates of curtailment (which may interfere
with current land use patterns) or high interconnections to neighbouring countries. Utilisation factors
of technologies also vary across countries, depending on weather conditions. In addition to differences
across spatial scales, the temporal scale is also important when considering decarbonisation scenarios:
different types of storage services, in fact, are useful for fluctuations occurring at different scales [47].
Current statistics do not allow for this type of analysis. Therefore, it would be advisable for
supra-national statistical bodies such as Eurostat to include data across shorter timescales.
The results presented are considered to be conservative, as two elements which have not
been included in the model may increase GHG emissions substantially: (i) the change in end-use
infrastructure required by an increased electrification of the energy sector (such as the manufacturing
of electric cars); and (ii) the turnover of funds. There is uncertainty associated with the possible lifetime
of grid-scale batteries [47], however, it is likely that within the 30-year timeframe considered in the
study some turnover will be necessary, by either producing new batteries or recycling existing ones.
Accounting for the emission flows associated with funds leads to higher emissions than those
envisioned by current scenarios. Thus, results suggest that sustainable production narratives cannot
alone lead to a decarbonisation of the energy sector. To be effective, sustainable production efforts
must be paired with strong efforts for sustainable consumption [48]. These should not only spurred
by mechanisms such as efficiency and technology but also, and crucially, by radical changes in
consumption patterns. This is line with the metabolic view of society [49], which draws a clear
connection between production and consumption patterns: changes in the way in which energy
carriers are produced inevitably require changes in the way in which they are consumed. This may
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entail a shift not only in how things are done (structural changes, e.g., technology and efficiency) but
also in what is done and why (functional changes, e.g., who is consuming what energy, to do what).
5. Conclusions
Fighting climate change, reducing air pollution and increasing security are three entangled
priorities of the EU. Decarbonisation has become a central strategy to deal simultaneously with
these disparate targets. However, governing a shift to a decarbonised economy has not been simple.
We suggest that this difficulty is partly due to the framing of models used to inform deliberative
processes. A focus on the monetary aspects of funds, particularly infrastructure, rather than on the
biophysical ones, such as GHG emissions, has minimised discourses linked to the magnitude of the
material transformations required to restructure the energy system.
Focusing on the EU power sector in the years 2020–2050, we modelled two decarbonisation
pathways in relation to GHG emissions. The scenarios consider operational GHG emissions
of electricity generation, as well as those associated with the lifetime of renewable and storage
infrastructure. Contrary to the decarbonisation pathways used to inform EU decision-making,
the alternative decarbonisation pathways take into account grid flexibility requirements from a
biophysical perspective. For the chosen pathways, this entails accounting for the GHG emissions
associated either with high rates of curtailment or with storage infrastructure. The results show how
emission curves behave differently under different flexibility pathways, and relative peaks of GHG
emissions across the years, as well as overall higher cumulative emissions, may emerge depending on
the set of assumptions.
Many questions arise from a biophysical problem framing of decarbonisation, for example: What
is the best timing to implement technologies? What are the trade-offs among different technological
pathways and storage solutions? What trade-offs may emerge between local and global environmental
effects? By suggesting that a rapid decarbonisation of the EU power sector by 2050 is “feasible
and viable” [14], and therefore glossing over biophysical obstacles to renewable transformations,
the scientific tools informing EU decision-making do not open up a space to discuss these crucial issues.
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